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We examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing, using a methodology that exploits the variation 
within countries and across manufacturing sectors, and corrects for possible reverse causality. We find that aid 
inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country’s competitiveness, as reflected in the lower relative growth 
rate of exportable industries. We provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real 
exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows. We conjecture that this may explain, in part, why it is hard 
to find robust evidence that foreign aid helps countries grow.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
There is a voluminous literature on the effect of foreign aid on economic growth.
 1  A 
fair summary would be that this literature does not provide robust evidence of either a 
positive or negative correlation between foreign aid inflows and the economic growth of poor 
countries. The absence of a robust positive correlation is particularly surprising since the 
primary purpose of most aid flows is to further the economic development of the recipient. 
What might explain the paucity of evidence for foreign aid propelling economic growth?   
One possible answer may be that there are costs emanating from aid that offset the 
benefits -- which include higher levels of physical investment, better education, and health, 
all paid for by the resource transfer. The classic analysis of these costs goes back to the 
Keynes-Ohlin debates on the effects of foreign transfers (such as aid) on the real exchange 
rate. For the case of foreign aid, the seminal work is van Wijnbergen (1985, 1986) building 
on the work of Corden and Neary (1982) in the context of natural resource discoveries.  
In a simple two-good model, increased aid will have two effects. First, aid could 
disproportionately be targeted at expanding non-tradable services such as construction, health 
care, and education for which there is substantial unmet demand. This will increase wages in 
that sector (given a fixed supply of skilled labor in the short run), will draw skilled labor into 
the non-tradable sector, and increase wages overall. Given that the international price of 
traded goods is fixed, the higher wage in terms of traded goods will reduce traded sector 
profitability, competitiveness, and lead to a decline in exports. In Corden and Neary (1982)’s 
terminology, this is the resource movement effect. 
                                                 
1 Important work includes Boone (1996), Alesina and Weder (2000), Bauer (1971), Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004), Collier and Dollar (2002), Dalgaard, Hansen, 
and Tarp (2004), Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), Friedman (1958), Hansen 
and Tarp (2001), Rajan and Subramanian (2008), Roodman (2004), Svensson (2003), and World 
Bank (1998).    - 2 - 
 
In addition, the higher wages will be spent, raising the price of non-traded goods 
relative to traded goods (the real exchange rate) and further hurting traded sector 
competitiveness. Corden and Neary (1982) would term this the spending effect. 
These are short run effects. But, in principle, in the medium run, aid could 
simultaneously also increase the productivity and supply of non-traded goods (for example, if 
the aid is spent on imparting skills and expanding the availability of skilled labor), offsetting 
the initial spending and resource movement impacts on relative prices. The overall impact, at 
least in the medium run—which is the focus of this paper—cannot be predicted a priori (also 
see Torvik (2001)). The more aid is spent on traded goods or factors (imported capital goods, 
foreign consultants) and on factors that are not in limited supply (unskilled labor), the more 
the supply of factors and non-traded goods respond to aid inflows, and the more domestic 
fiscal contraction takes place, the less likely will wages and prices be bid up to an excessive 
degree and the less likely will the real exchange rate appreciate (see Berg et al. (2005)). Thus 
whether aid reduces competitiveness and shrinks the tradable goods sector by pushing up the 
real exchange rate is ultimately an empirical question. 
A hint that aid may have costs via its impact on the tradable sector is provided in 
Figure 1, where we plot the log of the value added in manufacturing to GDP ratio in a 
country against the log of the ratio of aid received to GDP for that country for two separate 
dates (the late 1990s and the early 1980s, separated by about 15 years), after correcting for 
the country’s per capita PPP GDP, per capita PPP GDP squared, and country and time fixed 
effects.
2 As the figure suggests, the more aid a country has received, the smaller its share of 
                                                 
2 The residuals are obtained in a panel regression where the dependent variable is log of the ratio of 
the share of value added in manufacturing to GDP for a country (at two dates, the late 1990s and the 
early 1980s, separated by about 15 years), and the explanatory variables are the country’s per capita 
GDP, per capita GDP squared (to allow for the U-shaped relationship postulated by Kuznets), and 
fixed effects for the country and the time period. All variables are averages for the period 1980-85 
and 1995-2000, respectively. We focus on the period after 1980 because the coverage of the World 
(continued)   - 3 - 
 
manufacturing. The coefficient estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
ratio of aid-to-GDP is associated with a reduced share of manufacturing in total GDP of 
about 0.2-0.3 percentage points.
3  
In Figure 2 we obtain a similar negative relationship when we plot the log of the ratio 
of manufacturing share to the share of services against the log of aid to GDP after similar 
corrections. So the inflow of aid is correlated with slower manufacturing growth, and the 
slower growth of manufacturing relative to services. 
What might explain this pattern? Assuming that services are less tradable than 
manufacturing (at least for the period covered by our analysis), the figures suggest that aid 
and the relative size of tradable sectors in an economy are negatively correlated. The focus of 
our paper is then on providing more persuasive evidence for the channel through which this 
correlation emerges; that the inflow of aid leads to a relative shrinkage of the tradable 
manufacturing sectors of the economy and that this shrinkage occurs through the appreciation 
of the recipient country’s real exchange rate.   
Why might this matter? For instance, a number of studies (Jones and Olken (2005) 
and Rodrik (2008)) have argued that the traded goods sector is the channel through which an 
economy absorbs best practices from abroad. The absence of these learning-by-doing 
spillovers, which may be critical to long run productivity growth, could be one constraint on 
growth. Indeed, Jones and Olken (2005) and Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2006) point 
out that virtually all countries that have had a sustained period of growth in the post-war 
period have seen a large increase in their share of manufacturing and manufacturing exports.    
                                                                                                                                                       
Bank data on sectoral output increases substantially and also because the core analysis in the paper 
below is on the 1980s and 1990s. The sample comprises countries that had an aid received to GDP 
ratio greater than 1 percent or are low income countries. The relationship depicted in the graph is 
robust to additional controls such as the terms of trade. 
3 Because we include fixed effects, the association between aid and manufacturing depicted in the 
chart is a temporal one, that is, within countries over time rather than one between countries.    - 4 - 
 
While these studies do not establish beyond doubt that there is a line of causation 
from manufacturing exports to overall growth—and this paper does not address this 
question—the existence of such a line would explain why the positive effects of aid are so 
hard to discern – aid leads to a shrinkage of the tradable manufacturing sector, which has 
adverse effects on overall growth. 
There are three notable differences between our approach and that of prior empirical 
work. First, the papers in the literature on the effects of aid on growth of manufacturing or of 
manufacturing exports employ the standard cross-country methodology.
4 The key innovation 
in our paper is to identify the effect of aid on manufacturing growth in a within-country 
cross-industry context, using the methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998). By absorbing 
country-specific variation in country indicators, and exploiting only the within-country 
across-industry variation, we go some way in addressing the specification problem that 
plague standard cross-country regressions – that some omitted country-specific variable 
might explain the observed correlation.
  
Second, the core of the paper aims to establish the effect of aid on the relative share 
of exportable sectors, and to provide evidence on the channel through which aid might have 
such effects. Specifically, we show that the effects of aid on relative industry growth rates 
seem to flow largely through the real exchange rates. In other words, we seek to establish that 
aid is the deep determinant, while exchange rates are the proximate transmission mechanism.  
Third, countries may get more aid if they perform particularly badly so aid is clearly 
endogenous to growth (though less clearly linked to relative industry growth rates). We 
address the issue of endogeneity by using plausibly exogenous instruments for aid. 
                                                 
4 The empirical literature on aid, exchange rates, and manufacturing includes Arellano et. al. (2004), 
Atingi-Ego and Sebudde (2000), Bulir and Lane (2002), Elbadawi (1999), Nyoni (1998), Prati and 
Tressel (2006), Vos (1998), Yano and Nugent (1999) and Younger (1992) but none of them exploits 
within-sector variation. A fuller description of this literature is in the online version of this paper.   - 5 - 
 
To preview our results, we find strong evidence that aid undermines the 
competitiveness of the exportable sectors. In particular, in countries that receive more aid, 
manufacturing industries that typically export more, and thus are more likely to be adversely 
affected by an appreciating real exchange rate, grow slower than manufacturing industries 
that typically export less.  
If indeed the channel is through aid’s effect on real exchange rates, we should see 
that: (1) aid inflows do affect exchange rates and lead to exchange rate appreciation in our 
sample; (2) in countries with a greater appreciation of the real exchange rate (or, more 
precisely, with a greater aid-induced appreciation) more exportable industries grow relatively 
more slowly; and (3) the independent effect of aid is somewhat attenuated when we include 
the extent to which the exchange rate has appreciated above the norm. We do see all these 
effects.   
  This paper is structured as follows.  In section II, we outline our empirical strategy. In 
section III, we present our main results on the effect of aid on the relative growth of sectors 
whose competitiveness is most likely to be adversely hit, and establish its robustness. In 
section IV, we provide evidence that exchange rate overvaluation (and not other policies or 
institutions) is the proximate channel through which aid has an effect, and  section V 
provides a conclusion.  
II. Aid and growth:  Empirical Strategy 
The following schematic representation of the effects of aid on prices and quantities.  
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Simply put, we hypothesize a relationship from aid to the growth of the tradable 
sector (channel A). Channel A can in turn be broken down to two mediating channels: from 
aid to real exchange rates (B) and from real exchange rates to the growth of the tradable 
sector (C). We do not have a fully elaborated structural model that can test all these effects 
simultaneously so we will test for these individual relationships in the data.  
We use the methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test the hypothesis that aid 
inflows might reduce the competitiveness of the traded goods sector. They suggest that one 
way to check whether a channel is at work is to see whether industries that might be most 
affected by a channel grow differentially (faster or slower depending on the nature of the 
effect) in countries where that channel is likely to be more operative. The industry 
characteristic we are interested in is the degree to which an industry’s competitive position is 
affected by exchange rate appreciation, the channel is real exchange rate appreciation, and 
countries that get more aid are likely to be the ones where the channel is most operative. The 
estimation strategy is then to run regressions of the form: 
Growthij = Constant + ζ1.....m*Country Indicators + ζm+1....n* Industry Indicators + 
ζn+1*(Industry i’s share of manufacturing in country j in the initial period) +  
α (Aid to country j* Sensitivity of industry i to exchange rate appreciation) +  εij      
                (1) 
 
where Growthij is the annual average rate of growth of value added of industry i in country j 
over a ten-year period, obtained by normalizing the growth in nominal value added by the 
GDP deflator; ζ1.....m  are the coefficients of the country fixed effects; ζm+1....n are the 
coefficients of the industry fixed effects;  ζn+1 is the coefficient of the initial period share of 
industry i in total value added in country j (which controls for convergence-type effects); Aid 
to country j is the average aid to GDP ratio for that country over the sample period. The 
coefficient of interest for us is α.  It captures an interaction between a country-specific aid   - 7 - 
 
variable and an industry’s sensitivity to the exchange rate effects induced by foreign aid. We 
posit that countries that receive more aid should see a more negative impact in industrial 
sectors that are more sensitive, so that we would expect the coefficient α to be negative. 
The chief advantage of this strategy is that by controlling for country and industry 
fixed effects, the problem of omitted variables bias or model specification, which seriously 
afflicts cross-country regressions, is diminished. Essentially, we are making predictions 
about within-country differences between industries based on an interaction between a 
country and industry characteristic. Moreover, because we focus on differences between 
manufacturing industries (rather than between, say, manufacturing and services industries), 
we can rule out factors that would keep manufacturing underdeveloped as explanations of 
our results – for these factors should not affect the differences between manufacturing 
industries. 
A.   Implementing the Strategy 
However, this focus on manufacturing only (driven also by data availability) comes at 
a cost. The manufacturing sector, by and large, is tradable. So how do we develop a proxy for 
the sensitivity, or relative sensitivity, of an industry to the competitiveness effects of aid?  
One approach is to recognize that in a poor developing country, the lack of 
competitiveness is likely to show up to a greater extent in exports, than in import-competing 
industries. This is in part because, during the time-period under study, in a poor country with 
an overvalued exchange rate, government actions to support import-competing industries (for 
example, through import tariffs and non-tariff barriers) were easier than actions to support 
exporting industries (for example, through cash or tax subsidies). Our proxy for exportability 
is an indicator variable for each industry, which takes the value 1 if the industry has a ratio of 
exports to value added (averaged across all countries in the sample) greater than the median   - 8 - 
 
across industries.
5 The indicator takes the value zero otherwise. We call this indicator 
“exportability1.”
6  We use another measure of exportability, which is simply a dummy equal 
to one for the four industries that have been most closely associated with the growth of 
developing countries as they have moved out of agriculture: textiles, clothing, leather, and 
footwear. 
  Of course, not all exports are likely to be subject to adverse effects from aid. In 
particular, exports of extractable resources where labor intensity is low are unlikely to be 
affected by an overvalued real exchange rate. Fortunately, by focusing on manufacturing, we 
largely exclude such industries. 
Because we examine growth differentials between industries within countries, the 
results are less sensitive to the rationale for why aid is given. For example, even if aid is 
given only to countries that display poor growth, inter-industry growth differentials should 
not be seriously affected. So, in our core specification, we will report our results using a 
simple OLS estimation strategy. However, there can be a potential, if indirect, problem of 
reverse causality. Suppose low growth is primarily because countries have overvalued 
exchange rates, and aid is systematically given to countries that have more overvalued 
exchange rates. In this case, we might be attributing to aid what is actually driven by trade 
and exchange rate policies. One way to address this is to correct directly for policies, which 
we attempt to do. Another is through instrumentation, which allows us to disentangle the 
direction of causality. We will, therefore, also show that our results are robust to 
instrumentation. Our instrumentation strategy, which draws directly from Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008), is described in the Appendix.  
                                                 
5 We obtained these data from Nicita and Olarrega (2001).  
6 By discretizing our index we lose some information, but we also eliminate noise in classification. 
We also stay closer to the notion that either a product is exportable or it is not. 
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B.   Data and their Sources 
The data and sources are described in detail in Appendix 1. The data for industry 
value added growth comes from the Industrial Statistics Database (2003) of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).  The data are at the 3-digit level of 
the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC, 
Revision 2) and are available for the 1980s and 1990s. 
In order to keep the sample as large as possible without compromising our focus on 
long-term growth, we include all those industry observations where the average growth rate 
can be computed over at least a seven-year period in the decade. On this criterion, the 
UNIDO database has data for 47 developing countries for the 1980s and 31 countries for the 
1990s. 
But our methodology is most applicable when we include broadly similar countries 
with roughly similar levels of technological endowments. At the same time, we do not want 
to exclude recipients of significant aid. Our final sample therefore comprises countries that 
receive aid greater than 1 percent of GDP or are low-income countries according to World 
Bank definitions in the initial year of the sample. Our sample then has 32 countries for the 
1980s and 15 countries for the 1990s. The UNIDO database contains data on 28 industries in 
these countries.
7 
In Table 1, we present means, medians, and standard deviations for the key variables 
in the analysis.  The median growth rate of value added for industries is 1.7 percent for the 
decade 1980-90 and 3.7 percent for 1990-2000. The average aid inflow into the 32 countries 
in the 1980-1990 sample is 5.3 percent of GDP and the average aid inflow into the 15 
                                                 
7 Appendix 1 lists all countries for which data were available as well as those countries that were 
included in the econometric analysis. 
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countries in the 1990-2000 sample is 4.7 percent of GDP. In much of the paper we will focus 
on the results for the 1980s because our sample is twice as large (32 countries and 684 
observations) as it is for the 1990s (15 countries and 357 observations). We will only present 
some key results for the 1990s, and refer the reader to the working paper version for 
robustness checks.   
Some additional concerns need to be discussed. First, given that a number of 
countries are not covered by the UNIDO database, the concern arises whether the countries 
in our sample differ from the typical aid recipient. Comparing the core 1980s sample that we 
use in this paper with a larger sample (comprising all countries selected on the same criteria 
as in this paper and for which manufacturing data are available in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators), we find countries in our sample receive moderately less aid (5.6% 
relative to 7.0%) and grow somewhat faster (GDP growth 1.0 % vs 0.7%, manufacturing 
growth 4.8% vs 3.6%). Countries in our sample are neither considerably worse in 
performance, nor indeed very different from the larger sample. The variation in our sample 
on these indicators is also not very different (see Appendix Table 1D). Prima facie, there is 
no clear evidence that our sample is “special.” 
A second potential concern, related to the above, is that only a few countries in our 
sample have significant manufacturing sectors, limiting the relevance of our analysis. On 
this, it is worth pointing out that the share of manufacturing in GDP in our sample is not very 
different from the larger set of developing countries that receive aid greater than 1 percent of 
GDP (see row 3 in Appendix Table 1D). In other words, it is possible that, and indeed this is 
what our core results purport to establish, this low share is a consequence of aid. Thus, low 
manufacturing share is not in itself a reason not to explore the impact of aid, although it is 
clearly relevant when evaluating claims about the overall growth impact of aid. We will, 
however, undertake some robustness tests to address this concern.   - 11 - 
 
 
II.   AID AND SENSITIVITY TO EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION 
A.   The Core Specification 
We present our core specifications in Table 2 for the 1980s and 1990s corresponding to the 
relationship depicted as channel A in the schema in Section II.A. The dependent variable is 
the annual average growth in value added in industry i in country j.  We estimate the 
coefficient of the interaction between exportability and aid. The four columns correspond to 
our two measures of exportability for the 1980s and 1990s sample. In all four cases, the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level or 
above. Value added in exportable industries grows relatively more slowly than for other 
industries in countries that receive more aid.  
What can we say about magnitudes?  The estimate in column suggests that in 
countries that receive an extra 1 percentage point of aid, exportable industries (as defined by 
the exportability1 index) grow slower by about 0.5 percentage point per annum relative to 
non-exportable industries. The estimate in column 2 suggests that clothing and footwear 
sectors grow slower by about 1 percentage point a year relative to other industries in 
countries that receive 1 percentage point of GDP more in aid. This is quite substantial when 
compared with the average growth rate in the sample of 1.8 percent. The estimated 
magnitudes are slightly larger for the 1990s. 
We depict this core result for the 1980s in a non-parametric form in Chart 3.  We 
divide the industries into two groups (above- and below-median) depending on their 
exportability.  Next we estimate for each country the difference in average growth in annual 
value added between above-median and below-median exportable industries. We plot this 
difference against the aid-to-GDP received by each country. Chart 3 shows that the   - 12 - 
 
difference in growth is negatively related to the aid received by a country, and no single 
country drives it. 
B.   Robustness to Instrumentation 
As we said earlier, there is no obvious reason to expect growth in particular industries 
to drive aid or to determine the inherent exportability of industries. However, there can be a 
potential, if indirect, problem of reverse causality. Suppose low growth is primarily because 
countries have overvalued exchange rates, and aid is systematically given to countries that 
have more overvalued exchange rates. In this case, we might be attributing to aid what is 
actually driven by trade and exchange rate policies. So, we check if our results are robust to 
instrumentation, using the instrument we developed in Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
The key idea for instrumentation in Rajan and Subramanian (2008) is to model the 
supply of aid based on donor-related rather than recipient-specific characteristics. In other 
words, we base our instrument on considerations that drive individual donors to give aid to a 
country other than those related to a country’s level of income or growth. So, our 
construction of instruments starts from the bilateral donor-recipient relationship – including 
measures like colonial ties, common language, and relative size to predict bilateral aid flows 
--  and this is then aggregated up to calculate predicted aid (as Frankel and Romer (1999) 
have done in the trade literature).  This is in contrast to the literature that picks instruments 
directly at the level of the recipient country. 
 The results are presented in Table 3, columns 1 and 2. The second-stage results for 
the interaction terms are in Panel A, with the corresponding first-stage in Panel B.
 8 The 
coefficient on the interaction term continues to be significant, and the magnitudes of these 
                                                 
8 In this table, the standard errors in the second-stage regressions are corrected to take account of the 
fact that the instrument used in the first-stage is estimated.  We used the procedure in Frankel and 
Romer (1999) to do this correction.    - 13 - 
 
coefficients are greater than the OLS estimates. The results in Panel B show that there is no 
problem of weak instrumentation because the F-value for the instrument is above 50 in all 
columns, which comfortably exceeds the Staiger-Stock (1997) threshold of 10 for strong 
instruments.
9  
One concern might be that the countries in our base regression include ones with tiny 
manufacturing sectors, which may skew the results. As a check that this does not drive our 
results, we include only countries that had a manufacturing to GDP share greater than 15%. 
In Table 3, columns 3 and 4, we find the coefficient estimates for this narrower sample to 
also be statistically and economically significant. 
Another concern is that the historical and colonial ties in our instrument might proxy 
for the quality of a country’s institutions. From ICRGE (International Country Risk Guide), 
we obtain a measure of the quality of government institutions that affect property rights or 
the ability to conduct business. We then control for institutional quality (interacted with the 
exportability indicators to capture the fact that exportables may be more institution-intensive) 
in columns 5 and 6. The core interaction coefficient between aid and exportability remains 
qualitatively similar in magnitude and significance.
10  
 
III.   THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM FROM AID TO SECTORAL GROWTH 
To summarize the results thus far, we have shown the link between aid and the 
relative growth of exportable industries. The theory we have laid out suggests this is because 
of the effect of aid on the real exchange rate, which in turn adversely affects the labor-
intensive and exportable industries. This then leads to the natural question: how can we be 
                                                 
9 With one endogenous variable, the F-value for the strength of the instrument is simply the square of 
the t-statistic associated with its coefficient. 
10 In a longer version of this paper that is available online, we show that our results are robust to 
alternative samples, notably the exclusion of outliers, to clustering of standard errors, to alternative 
measures of value added growth, and to alternative measures and types of aid.   - 14 - 
 
sure that our core result does indeed reflect such an effect and what is the connection 
between aid and real appreciation? To answer these questions we can bring to bear more 
evidence, direct and indirect, relating to real exchange rate appreciation. 
A.    Does Aid “Cause” Excess Appreciation? 
Before we elaborate on our results, we need to clarify the term “excess appreciation”. 
Strictly speaking aid, via its spending effect, causes a currency appreciation which leads to a 
decline in exports. The problem, however, is that currency appreciation could also be a trend 
phenomenon associated with rising trade and incomes (the Balassa-Samuelson effect). 
Therefore, we want to pick up the measure of real appreciation that is over and above that 
suggested by the Balassa-Samuelson effect – that real exchange rates increase with real 
incomes. We follow Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian (2007) (and implicitly, Dollar (1992), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik (2008)) in measuring excess appreciation or 
overvaluation.
11 
In Table 4, we provide evidence that excess appreciation is the channel through which 
aid affects exports. In column 1, we show the simple correlation between excess appreciation 
and aid inflows which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. If real appreciation is 
the channel, then like aid, it should particularly affect exportable sectors.  In other words, in 
countries with more appreciated exchange rates, exportable and labor-intensive sectors 
should grow relatively slower than other sectors. We therefore estimate model (1) above with 
the difference that we replace the aid variable with our measure of excess appreciation. The 
results in columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 show that the interaction term between excess 
                                                 
11 The measure of excess appreciation is based on departures from long-run PPP. For every year in the 
sample period, we regress over the cross-section of countries, a country’s price level of GDP from the 
Penn World Tables (6.1) on its real GDP per capita (in PPP terms). The deviation of the actual price 
level from the estimated price level is a measure of the country’s excess appreciation. We averaged 
the annual values over the 1980s and 1990s respectively to obtain the final measure of excess 
appreciation.   - 15 - 
 
appreciation and either of our exportability measures is negative and significant. The 
coefficient estimates suggest that a one percentage point excess appreciation reduces the 
annual average growth of the exportable sectors by 0.07 and 0.2 percent, respectively, for the 
two measures of exportability. We have checked these results are robust to replacing our 
measure of excess appreciation with other measures of exchange rate overvaluation, 
including the recent work of Rodrik (2008) and Easterly and Levine (2003) and find that the 
results described here hold for those measures too (available from the authors upon request). 
We have just established that excess exchange rate appreciation has a similar effect as 
aid on the growth in value added of exportable industries. Another way to check this is to 
introduce both the aid and excess appreciation interactions in the same regression, which we 
do in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. If aid is indeed the deep causal determinant, and excess 
appreciation the main mediating channel, we should find that the direct effect of the aid 
interaction should be highly attenuated in the presence of the excess appreciation 
exportability interaction.  Indeed, this is what we find. In both cases, the coefficient estimate 
of the excess appreciation interaction remains significant, while that for the aid interaction 
shrinks in both magnitude and statistical significance. This suggests that excess appreciation 
may represent the channel through which aid has influence.
12 
We offer one final piece of evidence in favor of excess appreciation as the channel, 
using our instrument for aid (interacted with exportability) in explaining the degree of excess 
appreciation (interacted with exportability) in the first stage, and use the predicted excess 
appreciation interaction in the second stage. The IV results for the second stage (columns 6 
and 7, Panel A) suggest that the component of overvaluation caused by exogenous aid 
inflows does hurt competitiveness.  
                                                 
12 We obtained very similar results when we used the Easterly and Levine (2003) measure of 
overvaluation.    - 16 - 
 
B.   Is the Excess appreciation a Reflection of other Policies Rather than Aid? 
Is the observed significant estimate for the exportability-aid intensity interaction a 
proxy for other policies than aid? Consider trade reform. It is well-known that trade reform 
alleviates the anti-export bias of a regime. Is it possible that countries are poor because they 
have bad trade policies, and this, not aid, is responsible for the pattern of industry growth we 
observe? Indeed, could restrictive trade policies themselves be responsible for the observed 
excess appreciation (see, for example, Bhagwati and Desai (1973) or Krueger (1975)) One 
way to test this is to include an interaction between the strength of trade liberalization 
policies and exportability. If the trade reform interaction swamps the aid interaction, we 
would have less confidence that aid causes the differential growth patterns we observe.   
In Tables 5A and 5B column 1, we include the Sachs-Warner measure of trade reform 
interacted with the exportability measures. We find that the coefficient on the trade policy 
interaction is insignificant but the aid interaction is relatively unchanged in magnitude and 
statistical significance. In column 2, we check whether trade policy as measured by the 
average level of tariffs interacted with exportability has any impact on the effect of the aid 
interaction. The aid interaction continues to have a negative and significant coefficient.
13 
One could argue that exchange rate mismanagement and distortions result in slow 
growth, aid inflows, and the observed relative growth patterns of industries. In column 3, we 
use a measure of the black market premium (from Reinhart and Rogoff (2003)) instead of the 
trade policy measure, and obtain similar results.
14 In column 4, we introduce an interaction 
between macroeconomic instability (which we measure as the standard deviation of 
                                                 
13 Tariffs are unweighted averages across all products and are obtained from the World Bank’s 
database available (and explained in greater detail) at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2105
1044~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. 
14 Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argue that both the Sachs-Warner and black market premium 
measures are measures not just of trade policy but of broader macroeconomic stability.   - 17 - 
 
consumer price inflation) and exportability. Again, the aid-exportability coefficient estimate 
is relatively unchanged in these two specifications. Hence, the results in columns 1-4 
suggests that it is aid rather than trade or macroeconomic policies that cause exchange rate 
appreciation, reinforcing the message obtained from instrumentation. 
The next step is to show that aid does not affect industry growth through channels 
other than excess appreciation.  One alternative explanation of the basic interaction between 
exportability and aid is that industries with a high need for capital (which need not be the 
exportable industries) grow relatively faster as a country receives aid inflows. This would be 
a relatively benign explanation of our basic findings, suggesting that aid relieves financing 
constraints and increases the overall resource envelope.
15 
There are three reasons why this is an unlikely explanation. First, the evidence in the 
introduction suggests the manufacturing sector (which is typically more capital intensive than 
the services sector) is relatively smaller than the service sector in aid receiving countries, not 
consistent with the benign “aid is financing” explanation. Second, we have also seen the 
adverse effects of aid on the relative growth rates of exportable industries comes through an 
excess appreciation of the real exchange rate. Again, this is inconsistent with the benign 
explanation. 
Third, if the capital-enhancing channel is at work (rather than the real-exchange-rate-
excess appreciation channel), countries that receive more aid should see an increase in the 
output of industries that are more dependent on external financial resources. To control for 
any possible effect of aid in alleviating financing constraints, we include the interaction of 
aid inflows with the Rajan and Zingales (1998) variable that measures the dependence of a 
                                                 
15 The simplest example of aid providing more resources to the private sector would be one where the 
government reduces its borrowing from the banking system in response to the aid, and hence makes 
more credit available to the private sector.   - 18 - 
 
particular industry on external resources to finance investment. Thus, if aid increases the 
resource envelope available to the industrial sector, we should expect the coefficient of this 
interaction term to be positive. Moreover, if the availability of capital rather than 
exportability is what matters, the coefficient on the aid-exportability interaction term should 
fall in magnitude when we include the aid-financial dependence interaction. 
In Tables 5A and 5B, column 5, we add another term, which is the interaction of aid 
and financial dependence of an industry. Only the aid-exportability interaction is statistically 
significant (and negative). The aid-financial dependence interaction is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, it does not appear that the channel through which the relative growth 
rates are affected by aid is via capital-intensive sectors getting increased access to resources. 
The magnitudes of the aid-exportability interaction coefficient are broadly similar to that 
estimated in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, suggesting that exportability is not an indirect proxy 
for resource intensity.  
 
IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Taken together, our results suggest there may indeed be an adverse impact of aid on 
the relative growth of exportable sectors, and that the channel through which these effects are 
felt is the exchange rate overvaluation induced by aid.  
Despite the fact that for many aid-receiving countries, the manufacturing sector might 
be less important currently than agriculture, it is worth remembering that that was also true 
for many of the fast-growing countries when they first embarked upon development.  
Manufacturing exports provided the vehicle for their growth take-off, so any adverse effects 
on such exports should prima facie be a cause for concern about the effects of aid on growth.  
The message from our work is that countries should avoid creating the conditions that 
generate uncompetitive exchange rates. To the extent that aid inflows are responsible, it   - 19 - 
 
would suggest a focus on the part of both donors and recipients on tailoring aid flows to the 
absorptive capacity for aid in the economy.  
More generally, the theory does not suggest that the adverse effects of aid on 
competitiveness are inevitable, but our evidence indicates that the historical experience has 
not been positive. From a research perspective, it is perhaps more fruitful now to move 
beyond the inconclusive debate of whether aid is effective, and focus on specific ways it can 
be made to work better, by better understanding the reasons that might impair or enhance its 
effectiveness.    
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-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Log Aid/GDP
coef = -.18360776, (robust) se = .06179716, t = -2.97
 
This plot is based on running a panel regression where the dependent variable is log of the 
ratio of the share of value added in manufacturing to GDP for a country (at two dates, the late 
1990s and the early 1980s), and the explanatory variables are the country’s per capita PPP 
GDP, per capita PPP GDP squared, and fixed effects for the country and the time period. It 
can be interpreted as represented the conditional relationship between the change in the size 
of the manufacturing sector between 1980 and 2000 in a country and the change in aid over 
the same period. All variables are averages for the period 1980-85 and 1995-2000, 
respectively. To facilitate comparability with the core results in the paper, the sample was 
chosen according to the same criteria as in the core the sample of the paper, namely to 
include countries that had an aid-to-GDP ratio greater than 1 percent or are low-income 
countries. Data on manufacturing are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Log Aid/GDP
coef = -.19800019, (robust) se = .07449473, t = -2.66
 
This plot represents the conditional relationship between the change in the size of the 
manufacturing sector relative to the size of the services sector between 1980 and 2000 in a 
country and the change in aid over the same period. The share of the services sector is 
obtained as 1-(share of agriculture + share of industry). It is based on running a panel 
regression where the dependent variable is log of the ratio of the share of value added in 
manufacturing to GDP for a country (at two dates, the late 1990s and the early 1980s), and 
the explanatory variables are the country’s per capita PPP GDP, per capita PPP GDP 
squared, and fixed effects for the country and the time period. All variables are averages for 
the period 1980-85 and 1995-2000, respectively. To facilitate comparability with the core 
results in the paper, the sample was chosen according to the same criteria as in the core the 
sample of the paper, namely, to include countries that had an aid-to-GDP ratio greater than 1 
percent or are low-income countries. Data on manufacturing and services are from the World 




Chart 3: Non-Parametric Depiction of Core Results 
































































































0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Aid/GDP (j)
 























































































0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Aid/GDP (j)
 
We divide the industries into two groups—exportable and others. In panel A, the exportable industries are as 
defined by the exportability1 index, and in panel B as defined by the exportabillity2 index. Next we estimate for 
each country the difference in average growth in value added between the exportable and other industries.  The 





Growth Rate of Value Added ij 1980s 0.018 0.017 0.121 -0.457 0.754 684
1990s 0.030 0.037 0.108 -0.530 0.337 357
Initial Industry Share ij 1980s 0.045 0.022 0.068 0.000 0.562 684
1990s 0.041 0.020 0.064 0.000 0.525 357
Variables
Exportability1 Index i 1980s, 1990s 0.5 0 0.500 0 1 28
Exportability2 Index i 1980s, 1990s 0.14 0 0.354 0 1 28
Financial Dependence i 1980s 0.233 0.219 0.322 -0.451 1.140 27
Variables
Aid to GDP j 1980s 0.053 0.036 0.039 0.008 0.176 32
1990s 0.047 0.036 0.040 0.006 0.139 15
1980s -0.077 -0.153 0.355 -0.667 0.664 31
1990s -0.133 -0.011 0.368 -0.721 0.821 15
Policy (Sachs-Warner)  index j 1980s 0.279 0.000 0.378 0.000 1.000 32
1990s 0.775 1.000 0.335 0.000 1.000 15
Black Market Premium j 1980s 0.698 0.174 1.242 -0.008 5.936 30
1990s 0.142 0.054 0.288 0.017 1.247 15
1980s 7.639 7.732 0.609 6.406 8.659 31
1990s 7.750 7.830 0.708 6.202 9.106 15
Life Expectancy j 1980s 56.53 54.83 7.04 44.21 72.70 32
1990s 60.95 61.71 7.56 45.00 70.31 15
Geography j 1980s -0.709 -1.015 0.552 -1.040 0.724 32
1990s -0.641 -1.014 0.604 -1.040 0.724 15
1980s 0.409 0.399 0.127 0.183 0.723 28
1990s 0.528 0.526 0.054 0.405 0.610 14
Average Level of Tariffs j 1980s 33.279 29.000 22.047 4.000 97.000 32
1990s 23.277 24.000 8.291 10.000 45.000 15
Standard Deviation of Inflation j 1980s 153.021 6.348 712.080 2.053 3662.771 32
1990s 6.553 4.691 4.043 1.631 15.855 15
Average Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation j
Institutional Quality (ICRG) index j












Initial per Capita Income j (in log) 
Table 1. Summary Statistics
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OLS; 1980s OLS; 1980s OLS; 1990s OLS; 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial industry share(ij) -0.390*** -0.412*** -0.231** -0.219***
[0.084] [0.082] [0.089] [0.080]
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i) -0.506** -0.728**
[0.207] [0.304]
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability2 index(i) -1.042*** -1.258***
[0.311] [0.485]
Observations 684 684 357 357
R-squared 0.415 0.424 0.328 0.335
Table 2. Impact of aid on sectoral growth: Core specification
Dependent Variable is annual average rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j
 
Estimates are based on the OLS procedure.  All standard errors, reported below the coefficient estimates, are 
robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All equations include country 
and industry fixed effects. Initial industry share (ij) refers to the share of industry i in country j as a share of 
total manufacturing sector value added in country j. Aid/GDP (j) refers to the share of aid to GDP in country j 
averaged over the period. Exportability1 index is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of 
exports to value added is greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise. Exportability2 index is a dummy that 
takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 321-324, and 0 otherwise.    - 25 - 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i) -1.913*** -1.228** -1.561***
[0.644] [0.543] [0.543]
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability2 index(i) -3.718*** -1.381** -4.136***
[1.180] [0.693] [1.094]
Institutional quality*Exportability1 index(i) -0.053
[0.074]
Institutional quality*Exportability2 index(i) -0.050
[0.128]
Observations 684 684 350 350 622 622
R-squared 0.365 0.321 0.372 0.384 0.397 0.306
Fitted Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i) 0.230*** 0.298*** 0.292***
[0.032] [0.037] [0.034]
Fitted Aid/GDP(j)*Exportability2 index(i) 0.271*** 0.302*** 0.299***
[0.035] [0.039] [0.036]
Institutional quality*Exportability1 index(i) 0.004
[0.012]
Institutional quality*Exportability2 index(i) 0.015
[0.012]
Observations 684 684 350 350 622 622
R-squared 0.764 0.718 0.750 0.674 0.773 0.725
Manufacturing > 15%;        
Table 3. Impact of aid on sectoral growth: Robustness to instrumentation 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is annual average rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j
Panel B: First Stage for IV in Columns 1-6 of Panel A above
Dependent variable is Aid/GDP(j)*Exportability1 and Aid/GDP(j)*Exportability2, respectively
 
Estimates in this table use an instrumental variables (IV) procedure. Unless otherwise noted, all specifications 
are for the 1980s. All standard errors, reported below the coefficient estimates, are robust. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Standard errors are corrected, using the procedure in Frankel 
and Romer (1999), to allow for the fact that the instruments are estimated. All equations include country and 
industry fixed effects. Initial industry share (ij) refers to the share of industry i in country j as a share of total 
manufacturing sector value added in country j. Aid/GDP (j) refers to the share of aid to GDP in country j 
averaged over the period. Exportability1 index is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of 
exports to value added is greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise. Exportability2 index is a dummy that 
takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 321-324, and 0 otherwise. The specifications in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 are 
based on the core sample, while those in columns 3 and 4 are based on a sample of countries whose 
manufacturing to GDP ratio exceeds 15 percent. In Panel B, the dependent variable (which is the endogenous 
regressor in Panel A) is the product of aid/GDP in country j times the relevant exportability index (i).  Fitted aid 
is obtained from estimating a gravity-type model of bilateral aid flows as described in the Appendix. The 
institutional quality variable is from ICRGE (International Country Risk Guide) and is a measure of the quality 
of government institutions that affect property rights or the ability to conduct business. It is published by a 
private firm that provides consulting services to international investors. 
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Dependent Variable is annual average rate of growth of value 
added in industry i in country j 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Aid/GDP(j) 1980s  3.175*** 
[0.280] 
Excess appreciation(j)*Exportability1 index(i)  -0.069***  -0.058**  -0.190*** 
   [0.023]  [0.025]  [0.072] 
Excess appreciation(j)*Exportability2 index(i)  -0.199***  -0.179***  -0.510*** 
[0.030]  [0.031]  [0.149] 
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i)  -0.289 
   [0.223] 
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability2index (i)  -0.471 
[0.313] 
Observations  674  674  674  674  674  674  674 
R-squared  0.126  0.428  0.462  0.430  0.465  0.397  0.354 
                Panel B: First Stage for IV in Columns 6-7 of Panel A above 
Dependent variable is Excess appreciation(j)*Exportability1 and Exportability2 respectively 
Initial industry share(ij)  0.034  0.032 
[0.146]  [0.106] 
Fitted Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i)  1.972*** 
[0.300] 
Fitted Aid/GDP(j)*Exportability2 index(i)  2.158*** 
[0.318] 
Observations                 674  674 
R-squared                 0.538  0.239 
Estimates are based on the OLS procedure, except for those in columns 6 and 7.  All standard errors, reported 
below the coefficient estimates, are robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively. All estimations except for column (1) include country and industry fixed effects and initial 
industry share (ij) of industry i in country j as a share of total manufacturing sector value added in country j. 
Aid/GDP (j) refers to the share of aid to GDP in country j averaged over the period. Exportability1 index is a 
dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of exports to value added is greater than the median 
value and 0 otherwise. Exportability2 index is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 321-324, and 
0 otherwise.  The excess appreciation variable is from Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian (2007).  Note that the 
sample size is smaller than in the core specification because data on excess appreciation are not available for 
one country in the core specification. In columns 6 and 7, the instruments for excess appreciation are the same 
as those used for aid in Table 3.   - 27 - 
 
 
Table 5. Impact of aid on sectoral growth: Are there other channels? 
Dependent Variable is annual average rate of growth of value added in industry i in country j 
Panel A: Interacted with Exportability1 index(i) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability1 index(i) 
-
0.547***  -0.368*  -0.560**  -0.513** 
-
0.596*** 
[0.205]  [0.217]  [0.218]  [0.207]  [0.212] 
Policy(j)*Exportability1 index(i)  -0.014 
    [0.024] 
    Tariff*Exportability1 index(i)  0.001** 
  [0.000] 
  Black Market Premium(j)*Exportability1 index(i)  -0.003 
[0.008] 





Aid/GDP(j)*Financial dependence(i)  0.316 
[0.320] 
Observations  684  635  650  684  653 
R-squared  0.415  0.423  0.422  0.415  0.422 
Panel B: Interacted with Exportability2 index(i) 
Aid/GDP(j)* Exportability2 index(i)  0.975***  0.818**  1.034***  1.043***  1.030*** 
[0.324]  [0.331]  [0.318]  [0.312]  [0.320] 
Policy(j)*Exportability2 index(i)  0.023 
[0.030] 
Tariff*Exportability2 index(i)  0.002* 
[0.001] 
Black Market Premium(j)*Exportability2 index(i)  0.004 
[0.007] 





Aid/GDP(j)*Financial dependence(i)  0.109 
[0.323] 
Observations  684  635  631  684  653 
R-squared  0.424  0.438  0.431  0.424  0.429 
Estimates are based on the OLS procedure.  All standard errors, reported below the coefficient estimates, are 
robust. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All equations include country 
and industry fixed effects and initial industry share (ij) of industry i in country j as a share of total 
manufacturing sector value added in country j. Aid/GDP (j) refers to the share of aid to GDP in country j 
averaged over the period. Exportability1 index is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if an industry’s ratio of 
exports to value added is greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise. Exportability2 index is a dummy that 
takes on a value of 1 for ISIC sectors 321-324, and 0 otherwise. The policy variable is from Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003), the tariff variable from the World Bank, the black market premium variable from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), the inflation variability variable from the IMF, and the financial dependence variable from 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) (see Appendix Table 1A for details). Note also that the sample varies between 
columns because of data availability for some variables.  




Appendix 1.  Main Data Sources and Description 
 
￿  Industrial Statistics Database (2003) of the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) for data on value added and labor share. Data are at 3-digit 
level of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC, Revision 2). [UNIDO database].  
 
￿  World Development Indicators (World Bank) for the data on the share of  
manufacturing and services in GDP.  
 
￿  WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data (World Bank) for exportability index. 
 
￿  OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for data on aid. 
 
 
1.       Growth Rate of Real Value Added: 
The UNIDO dataset provides nominal value added both in terms of US dollars and 
local currency.  The value added figure in US dollars is used for all regression analysis.  The 
nominal value added (in current US dollars) was changed to a real value added (in constant 
Year 2000 US dollars), using the U.S. Producer Production Index provided by the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  This measure was, in 
turn, compared with the real value added in local currency to ascertain its reliability.
 16  More 
specifically, we required the correlation between the two be higher than 0.75 to be included 
in our base sample.       
  We then calculated the average annual growth rate of real value added for industry i 
in country j, for the 1980s and 1990s.  We calculated this wherever data existed for at least a 
seven-year period.  
  Countries with aid less than 1% of GDP are not included in the regression analysis 
because they included a number of emerging market and other countries such as Malta, 
Cyprus, and Kuwait that cannot be considered meaningful aid recipients. Peru is dropped 
from the base sample due to its unusually high level of growth rates in all industries in the 
UNIDO database (i.e. exceeds 100% in all sectors).  Niger is dropped from the 1990s sample 
as the data contained an observation where the ratio of wages to value added exceeded 17. 
We also dropped observations when this ratio exceeded one (this resulted in 10 and 12 
observations being dropped respectively from the sample for the 1980s and 1990s).   
 
                                                 
16 Since local PPI was not available for all developing countries in IFS, alternative deflators needed to 
be used to construct the measure of real value added in local currency.  Accordingly, whenever PPI 
was not available, we used the effective deflator constructed with the index of industrial production as 
in Rajan and Zingales (1998).  This deflator is the ratio of the growth rate of nominal value added in 
the entire manufacturing sector (from the UNIDO database) to the growth rate of the index of 
industrial production (from IFS).  Alternatively, a GDP deflator was used whenever these two series 
were not available.   - 29 - 
 
Appendix Table 1A.  List of Variables and Data Source 
Variable Names  Description  Source 
Growth Rate of  Value 
Addedij 
Industry i’s annual growth rate of value added in 




Industry i’s share in country j’s total manufacturing 
value added at the beginning of the decade. 
UNIDO (2003). 
Exportability1 indexi   A dummy that takes a value of 1 if industry i has a ratio 
of exports to value that exceeds the industry median 
value.  For each industry, the average ratio of exports to 
value added was calculated using a group of developing 
countries. 
WITS data, World 
Bank (at the 3-digit 
ISIC code).
17 
Exportability2 indexi   A dummy that takes a value of 1 for the four textiles 
and leather industries (ISIC 321-324).  
WITS data, World 
Bank (at the 3-digit 
ISIC code).  
Excess Appreciation j  This measure is based on long-run PPP. For every year 
in the sample period, we regressed a country’s price 
level of GDP from the Penn World Tables (6.1) on its  
real GDP per capita (in PPP terms). The deviation of 
the actual price level from the estimated price level is a 
measure of the country’s overvaluation. We averaged 
the annual values over the 1980s and 1990s respectively 
to obtain the final measure of overvaluation 




The measure of external financial dependence for all 
firms in industry i during the 1980s. 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). 
Aid / GDPj   The ratio of aid to GDP for country j.  OECD DAC database. 
Policyj  Percent of years that a country is considered open.  Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003). 
Tariffs  Unweighted average (across products) over years for 
which data are available 
World Bank (website 
described in footnote 
12 in the text. 
Black market 
premiumj   
Percent difference between a country’s parallel market 
and official exchange rate expressed in terms of the 
latter. 
 Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004). 
Institutional qualityj  Several ICRGE indices averaged for the relevant 
period. 
Bosworth and Collins 
(2003). 
Life expectancyj  Life expectancy at birth for beginning of the relevant 
decade. 
WDI 
Geographyj  Average of number of frost days and tropical land area.  Bosworth and Collins 
(2003). 
 
                                                 
17 The Trade and Production Database provides the WITS trade data at the 3-digit ISIC code.  This 
database is available at:  www.worldbank.org/research/trade    - 30 - 
 
 
Appendix Table 1B. Aid as a Percentage of GDP  
(* denotes inclusion in core sample) 
1980s     1990s 
Malawi*  17.56%    Tanzania*  13.92% 
Burundi*  14.90%    Ethiopia*  10.83% 
Senegal*  12.41%    Senegal*  10.40% 
Tanzania*  11.71%    Bolivia*  7.88% 
Papua New Guinea*  11.09%    Kenya*  6.73% 
Zambia*  10.72%    Jordan*  6.32% 
Madagascar*  8.67%    Cameroon*  4.65% 
Sri Lanka*  8.20%    Sri Lanka*  3.57% 
Kenya*  8.13%    Egypt*  3.29% 
Swaziland*  7.24%    Morocco*  1.55% 
Honduras*  6.48%    Philippines*  1.37% 
Botswana*  6.37%    Tunisia*  1.32% 
Bolivia*  6.15%    Mauritius*  1.13% 
Bangladesh*  5.91%    Indonesia*  1.02% 
Congo*  5.87%    Costa Rica  0.94% 
Jamaica*  5.68%    Panama  0.81% 
Costa Rica*  4.61%    Algeria  0.64% 
Israel  4.03%    India*  0.56% 
Mauritius*  3.59%    Russia  0.46% 
Fiji*  3.30%    Cyprus  0.34% 
Jordan*  3.15%    Uruguay  0.29% 
Egypt*  2.96%    Malaysia  0.28% 
Cote d'Ivoire*  2.77%    South Africa  0.27% 
Pakistan*  2.75%    Chile  0.25% 
Cameroon*  2.59%    Colombia  0.24% 
Ghana*  2.38%    Oman  0.18% 
Tunisia*  2.25%    Venezuela  0.05% 
Morocco*  2.14%    Korea  0.04% 
Philippines*  1.86%    Singapore  0.03% 
Guatemala*  1.48%    Kuwait  0.02% 
Indonesia*  1.17%    China (Hong Kong)  0.02% 
Thailand*  1.01%       
Malta  0.99%       
Panama  0.99%       
Cyprus  0.92%       
India*  0.76%       
Barbados  0.73%       
Uruguay  0.37%       
Algeria  0.33%       
Chile  0.32%       
Colombia  0.30%       
Bahamas  0.19%       
Singapore  0.16%       
Korea  0.08%       
Venezuela  0.07%       
Iran  0.06%       
Kuwait  0.03%          
   - 31 - 
 
 
Appendix Table 1C. Description of ISIC 3-digit Industries 
          
ISIC  Industrial sectors  Exportability1 
Index 
Exportability2 
Index  code   
       
       
311  Food products  1  0 
313  Beverages  0  0 
314  Tobacco  0  0 
321  Textiles  1  1 
322  Wearing apparel, except footwear  1  1 
323  Leather products  1  1 
324  Footwear, except rubber or plastic  1  1 
331  Wood products, except furniture  1  0 
332  Furniture, except metal  0  0 
341  Paper and paper products  0  0 
342  Printing and publishing  0  0 
351  Industrial chemicals  1  0 
352  Other chemicals  0  0 
353  Petroleum refineries  1  0 
354  Misc. petroleum and coal products  1  0 
355  Rubber products  0  0 
356  Plastic products  0  0 
361  Pottery, china, earthenware  0  0 
362  Glass and glass products  0  0 
369  Other non-metallic mineral products  0  0 
371  Iron and steel  0  0 
372  Non-ferrous metals  1  0 
381  Fabricated metal products  0  0 
382  Machinery, except electrical  1  0 
383  Machinery, electrical  0  0 
384  Transport equipment  1  0 
385  Professional and scientific equipment  1  0 
390  Other manufactured products  1  0 
 
Appendix Table 1D: Is the Core Sample Representative? 
 
Variable  Sample in 
this paper 
Larger sample  
Aid to GDP  
   Mean 







Real GDP growth 
   Mean 







Real value added growth in 
manufacturing 
   Mean 









Core sample comprises the 32 countries for which UNIDO’s disaggregate manufacturing data are available and 
that have aid to GDP less than 1 percent or fall in the category of low-income countries. Larger sample includes 
countries that satisfy the same criteria but for which data on aggregate manufacturing is available in the World 
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Appendix: Instrumentation Strategy 
Our instruments for aid are based on Rajan and Subramanian (2008). The key idea there is to 
model the supply of aid based on donor and donor-recipient relationships  rather than on 
recipient-specific characteristics. In other words, we base our instrument on considerations 
that drive individual donors to give aid to a country other than those related to a country’s 
level of income or growth. So, our construction of instruments starts from the bilateral 
(donor-recipient) relationship and aggregates up (as Frankel and Romer (1999) have done in 
the trade literature).   
 
We posit that donors lend for reasons of history and in order to have influence. The greater 
the extent of historic relationships between a donor and a recipient the more likely that a 
donor will want to give aid.  We capture historic relationships through colonial links and 
commonality of language.  
 
One way to proxy for influence is through the relative size of donor and recipient. The bigger 
the donor is relative to the recipient, the more influence the donor is likely to have, so the 
ratio of the donor population to that of the recipient could be a good proxy for influence. In 
addition, a donor’s influence is likely to be particularly pronounced if it is relatively large 
when it has close links with the recipient (so that it not only understands the pathways of 
influence but also potentially scares away other donors from seeking influence). We capture 
this channel by including the interaction between relative size and colonial links.  
 
An example should help fix ideas; the United Kingdom should be willing to give more aid 
per capita to Uganda than to India; but it will be more willing to give aid to Uganda than to a 
similar-sized country in Africa, say Senegal, because France is likely to have a significant aid 
presence in the latter, thus diluting any possibility of British influence. 
 












log( / )* log( / )*
log( /
drt rt drt drt
dr dr dr dr dr
dr dr d r
d r dr d r dr
d
A GDP Y
COMLANG CURCOL COMCOL COMCOLUK COMCOLFRA
COMCOLSPA COMCOLPOR POP POP
POP POP COMCOL POP POP COMCOLUK
POP
b u










)* log( / )*
log( / )*
r dr d r dr
d r dr drt






  (1) 
 
where  drt A  is the aid given by donor d to recipient r in time period t. GDPrt is the recipient 
country’s GDP.
 The first three RHS variables capture historic factors: COMLANG is a 
dummy that takes a value of one if the donor and recipient share a common language; 
CURCOL is a dummy that takes a value of one if the recipient is currently a colony of the 
donor. COMCOL is a dummy that takes a value of one if the recipient was ever a colony of 
the donor. The next four variables simply disaggregate the colonial variable to capture 
difference across donors in the susceptibility of their giving to colonial ties (COMCOLUK,   - 37 - 
 
COMCOLFRA, COMCOLSPA, and COMCOLPOR refer in turn to colonial relationships 
involving respectively France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom). 
 
The next set of variables relate to relative size. Donor size relative to the recipient is 
measured by the ratio of the logarithm of the populations of donor and recipient 
(log( / ) d r POP POP )
18 . Donor influence relative to other donors is additionally measured by 
the interaction of the relative population size and the colonial dummy 
(log( / )* d r dr POP POP COMCOL ).  
 
The estimated equation is then aggregated across donors to yield a level of the fitted value of 
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In Rajan and Subramanian (2008), we present estimates for the model in (1) and show that 
they yield meaningful results. In Table 3 of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), we present 
estimates for the model in (1). Virtually all the instrumenting variables are significant for all 
the time horizons, and between them the variables account for a reasonable share (between 
33 and 42 percent) of the variation in the donor allocation decision. All the colonial 
relationships are significant as are the two measures of influence. The larger the donor 
relative to the recipient, the greater the aid given; and this effect is magnified, as conjectured, 
in cases where the donor had a colonial relationship with the recipient. For example, for the 
period 1960-00, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of donor size relative to recipient is 
associated with a 0.1 percent increase in the ratio of aid to GDP given by the average donor, 
an amount which is increased by 0.2 percent for a U.K. colony (which is the sum of 0.6 
percent for the average colony minus 0.4 percent for the U.K. colony dummy), 1 percent for 
a Spanish colony; 1.9 percent for a French colony and 3.3 percent for a Portuguese colony. 
Thus, influence seems to matter a lot for donors, especially for Portugal and France.  
 
A few caveats are worth noting about this instrumentation strategy which is not perfect. It is 
possible that equation (1) does not apply equally to all donor-recipient pairs. Our claim here 
is not to explain fully the aid allocation decision but to extract some (hopefully exogenous) 
information from that decision that would be reasonable for instrumentation. We would note 
that since our regressions are all cross-sectional, additional complications from the time 
series aspects of aid are not introduced. Finally, it should be noted that we do use a country-
specific variable—namely population size—for instrumentation that might raise questions in 
terms of satisfying the exclusion restriction. 
 
                                                 
18 To minimize endogeneity-related problems, we use the initial rather than the contemporaneous 
value of population. 